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NOTE
The Law of Collision and the United States
Navy
J. MICHAEL LENNONt
I. INTRODUCTION: SETTING THE SCENE OF A COLLISION
On February 4, 1999, a crisp, clear winter night, the
United States Navy destroyer, the U.S.S. Arthur W.
Radford (DD 968), was steaming in slow circles around a
calibration buoy in the waters off Cape Henry, Virginia,'
conducting routine testing like hundreds of Navy ships
before her.2  Unlike her predecessors, however, the
Radford's testing was to conclude in a manner that was
anything but routine.
On that same night, the Saudi Arabian-flagged
merchant vessel, the MIV Saudi Riyadh, was heading
southward from New York City with a cargo of goods bound
for Baltimore, Maryland.! Her route to Baltimore was to
take her south towards Cape Henry, Virginia, where she
t J.D. Candidate, State University of New York at Buffalo Law School, 2003.
The author would like to thank his wife (and fellow former Naval Officer), Lisa
Lennon, for her enthusiasm and encouragement while writing this article.
1. In re Nat'l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia, 147 F. Supp. 2d 425, 430-31
(E.D. Va. 2000).
2. See Jack Dorsey, Court Sorts out a Case of Ship Collision; Navy has
Changed Testing Procedures to Avoid Accidents, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb. 4,
2000, at B1.
3. In re Nat'l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 431.
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was to steam into the designated shipping channel, enter
the Chesapeake Bay, and head north to her final destina-
tion.4 Unbeknownst to her sleeping crew, her journey was
not destined to follow that course.
At 11:35 p.m. E.S.T., the Radford and the Riyadh col-
lided off the coast of Southeastern Virginia, causing severe
damage to both vessels.5 The Radford suffered the more
severe damage of the two and limped back to port with her
forward deck gun bent and nearly toppled from its mount,
and an open gash running from her deck to the waterline.
As for the Riyadh, she too sustained a wide, saw-like gash
running along both sides of her bow, forcing her to
substitute a stay in the shipyards for her planned journey
to Baltimore.7
At the time of the collision, I was serving as a United
States Naval Officer onboard the U.S.S. Hayler (DD 997), a
Norfolk-based sister ship of the Radford, and was both
shocked and disturbed by the incident. Standing on the
deck of my own ship the morning after the collision,
watching the wounded Radford sail slowly up the Elizabeth
River, I distinctly remember asking myself two questions:
"How could this happen?" and "What happens next?"
Roughly two years later, during the early afternoon
hours of February 9, 2001, the U.S.S. Greeneville (SSN
772), a United States Navy nuclear submarine, was at sea
in the waters off the coast of Hawaii.! The Greeneville was
underway for the afternoon with a group of civilians, con-
ducting some routine drills and operations before heading
back to port.9
Also underway that day in the waters off Pearl Harbor
was the Japanese-flagged fishing vessel Ehime Maru, a
high school training boat from the small town of Uwajima
4. See Jack Dorsey, Ship Crash Trial Risky for Navy, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT,
Jan. 16, 2000, at B1.
5. In re Nat'l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 430.
6. Jack Dorsey, Navy Destroyer, Saudi Ship Damaged In Collision, THE
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb. 6, 1999, at Al.
7. Id.
8. John H. Cushman, Jr., Sub in Collision was Conducting Drill, Navy Says,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2001, at Al.
9. See id. See also New Clues from the Greeneville, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23,
2001, at A18.
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in southwestern Japan. ° With its crew of two teachers,
thirteen students, and roughly twenty fishermen, the tiny
vessel was actively engaged in its daily business of fishing
for tuna."
At approximately 1:45 p.m. Hawaii time (6:45 p.m.
E.S.T.), disaster struck. 2 The Greeneville, conducting an
emergency surfacing drill, charged up from the depths and
rammed into the fishing boat. 3 The impact of the collision
sent the smaller craft and nine of its crew to a watery
grave, and left the Navy with another set of troubling
questions.
Although no longer an active duty Naval Officer at the
time, I was still captivated by those events. Sitting at home,
watching the incident unfold on CNN, I found myself ask-
ing the same questions I had asked only two years earlier,
'How could this happen?' and 'What happens next?'
The purpose of this paper is to examine the latter of
those two questions, specifically focusing on the framework
that is in place to deal with the aftermath of a collision at
sea involving a United States Naval vessel. However, even
though my primary interest involves U.S. Navy collisions at
sea, it is important to note that the phenomenon of
collisions at sea is not limited to the ships of the U.S. Fleet.
In fact, the problems associated with collisions have existed
for as long as man has roamed the seas.15 Today, a fairly in-
tricate set of both international and domestic laws exists to
deal with these issues. 6 Such a system is necessary because
"[dlespite the widespread use of radar and other sophisti-
cated navigational aids, the schooling of ship's officers in
their proper use, and the adoption of traffic separation
schemes in congested waterways, marine collisions continue
to occur with discouraging frequency."'7
10. See Christopher Marquis, 9 are Missing off Pearl Harbor after U.S.
Submarine Collides with Japanese Vessel, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2001, at A16.
11. See id.
12. Id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See generally David R. Owen, The Origins and Development of Marine
Collision Law, 51 TUL. L. REV. 759 (1977).
16. See id.
17. Nicholas J. Healy & Joseph C. Sweeney, Basic Principles of the Law of
Collision, 22 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 359, 366. (1991) [hereinafter Healy & Sweeney
I].
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Thus, in Parts II, III and IV of this paper, I will explore
the origins of the legal framework for dealing with collisions
at sea, briefly detailing the development of the common law
and statutory schemes-both international and domestic-
that exist today. Then, in Part V, I will shift my focus to a
series of collisions at sea involving the United States Navy,
which exemplify some of the essential principles of collision
law. Following these discussions, in Part VI, I will
undertake an in-depth examination of the court proceedings
that flowed from the Radford/Riyadh collision mentioned
above. Finally, in Part VII, I will conclude this essay with
some predictions regarding the possible outcome of the
Ehime Maru incident.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF COLLISION LAW
A. The Laws of the Ancients
As with much legal thought and reasoning in our world
today, the law of collision has its roots in Ancient Greece.18
In fact, the earliest known system of maritime laws
originated on the Greek island of Rhodes about 300 B.C.,
and was adopted by the Romans centuries later. 9 The
"Rhodian Sea Law," compiled in about 600-800 A.D., was
the maritime code of the late Roman Empire, and contains
the oldest known incarnation of marine collision law.2 ° This
18. See Owen, supra note 15, at 759. For another discussion of the
development of international maritime law, see Gordon W. Paulson, An
Historical Overview of the Development of Uniformity in International Maritime
Law, 57 TUL. L. REV. 1065 (1983).
19. Owen, supra note 15, at 759-60. Neither the Ancient Greek nor early
Roman incarnations of maritime law contained a specific law of collision. Owen
speculates that given the high number of fast, far-ranging ships on the
Mediterranean during that period, there certainly must have been collisions,
but concludes that such accidents must not have risen to a level deemed worthy
of legal notice. After all, the ships of that era did not follow any fixed tracks,
and were typically laid up for at least half the year. Id. at 760.
20. Id. at 760. The statement, as quoted by Owen, is as follows:
If a ship in sail runs against another ship which is lying at anchor or
has slackened sail, and it is day, all the collision and the damage
regards the captain and those who are on board. Moreover, let the
cargo too come into contribution. If this happens at night, let the man
who slackened sail light a fire. If he has no fire, let him shout. If he
neglects to do this and a disaster takes place, he has himself to thank
for it, if the evidence goes to this. If the sailsman was negligent and the
984 [Vol. 50
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early maritime collision code focused primarily on the
question of fault (culpa), and assigned liability accord-
ingly.21
In time, the Roman Empire fell, but trading along the
Mediterranean did not cease, and in the stead of the Roman
maritime laws came the laws of the medieval city-states.
Many of the Mediterranean city-states had some form of
maritime code, but only three of those are known to have
addressed collision, and overall contributed little to the
development of collision law initiated by the Romans.22
Maritime codes also developed beyond the confines of
the Mediterranean, most prominently in the nations of the
North Atlantic Ocean and the North Sea.23 Both the Rolls of
Oleron (c. 1150) and the Laws of Visby (c. 1505), the most
notable maritime codes in these regions, set forth a rough
framework for dealing with the prospect of a collision. 4 As
with their Mediterranean counterparts, the Rolls of Oleron
and Laws of Visby concerned themselves primarily with
harbor collisions (i.e., collisions between a vessel under sail
and a vessel at anchor), testifying to the as yet limited
causes and incidences of collisions during those times.25
B. The Influence of English Admiralty
The next great influence on the development of the law
of collision came from the British, who created an
Admiralty Court in 1360, when the Lord High Admiral was
granted jurisdiction in civil maritime cases.26 Although
created in 1360, continuous records of the Court date only
from 1530 and include relatively few collision cases.27 This
watchman dozed off, the man who was sailing perished as if he ran on
shallows and let him keep harmless him whom he strikes.
Id. at 760-61.
21. See id. at 761.
22. See id. The three codes were the Constitutum Usus of Pisa (c. 1160), the
Statutes of Ancona (c. 1350) and the Consolato del Mare of Barcelona (c. 1340).
Id.
23. See id. at 762.
24. See Healy & Sweeney I, supra note 17, at 360. See also Owen, supra note
15, at 762-64.
25. Id. at 763.
26. Healy & Sweeney I, supra note 17, at 361. See generally Owen, supra
note 15, at 765-72 (detailing the development of maritime and collision law in
Britain from the early sixteenth through the early twentieth centuries).
27. Healy & Sweeney I, supra note 17, at 361.
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dearth of reported collision cases is ascribable to a number
of factors, including the relatively low incidence of collisions
and the statutory limitations imposed by the courts of
common law.28 Despite being few in number, however, there
were some extremely important cases decided in the
English Admiralty court. The most notable being the
Woodrop-Sims case, decided by Sir William Scott in 1815.29
In Woodrop-Sims, the judge stated in dicta four basic
principles of collision law, three of which remain univer-
sally true today. ° They are: "(1) each vessel bears its own
loss in cases of inevitable accident; (2) damages are divided
equally when both vessels are to blame; (3) there is no right
of recovery when the damaged vessel is alone to blame; and
(4) the damaged vessel is entitled to a full recovery when
the other is solely at fault."'" With the exception of the
second principle, which was abolished in England in 1911
in favor of the comparative fault rule,32 the other three
remain hornbook collision law today.
C. The Road to the Modern Law of Collision
Collision law, as we know it today, originated in the
mid-nineteenth century.33 The tremendous expansion of
commerce and navigation that swept the globe at that time
resulted in more frequent and more expensive collisions
than the world had seen before, and demanded that there
be some sort of global consensus regarding how to deal with
such occurrences.4 Perhaps the central figure of this devel-
opment was Dr. Stephen Lushington, Judge of the English
High Court of Admiralty from 1838 to 1867."5
During Dr. Lushington's tenure, collision cases became
much more frequent for a number of reasons, not the least
of which was the expansion of the Admiralty Court's juris-
diction by Parliament.36 Dr. Lushington, a former Admiralty
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. For a more thorough discussion of comparative fault (also known as
apportionment), see infra Part III.D.
33. See Owen, supra note 15, at 759.
34. Id.
35. Healy & Sweeney I, supra note 17, at 362.
36. Id. See also Owen, supra note 15, at 768.
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lawyer and member of Parliament until 1841, seized the
opportunity presented him, and was the "judicial architect"
of the first known set of collision prevention regulationsY.
Among the most important of his innovations was the
promulgation of the general rule that when in a meeting or
crossing situation, steam powered vessels were to turn
starboard (i.e., right) to avoid collision, a rule drilled into
the heads of aspiring sailors (including U.S. Naval Officers!)
even today."
Not surprisingly, the collision law that developed in
England in the mid-nineteenth century also migrated
across the Atlantic to America, where it influenced a hand-
ful of district court judges deciding the relatively few col-
lision cases emanating from our country at the time. 9
Interestingly, the Supreme Court has had little effect on the
development of collision law in this country, having decided
its first collision case in 1840, and relatively few since.4' For
the most part, the courts of the United States have been
content to follow the lead of their Continental European
brethren in this area.4 1
Under the guiding hand of Dr. Lushington, the British
began adopting collision regulations in the mid-nineteenth
century. The success of these regulations with respect to the
Queen's vessels led the British Board of Trade to develop
and promulgate a complete set of collision regulations,
which they encouraged the rest of the maritime world to
adopt.42 In 1863, the French agreed by treaty to follow the
British regulations, and "by 1868, 33 other nations-
including the United States-had notified the United
Kingdom that their vessels would be bound by the rules,
even when outside British waters. 43
Eventually, the United States Congress decided to
make its presence felt as well, enacting legislation relating
to navigational lights in 1838 and 1849, and, in 1851, di-
recting the U.S. Navy to enforce a regulation requiring "all
37. Id. at 769.
38. Id. As for the Naval Officer part, I know that from personal experience. I
learned the hard way never to come to port (left) in a meeting situation.
39. See id. at 772-73.
40. Id. at 777-78. In fact, "[s]ince 1900, the Supreme Court has only decided
twenty-three cases that even indirectly involved collision law." Id.
41. Healy & Sweeney I, supra note 17, at 362.
42. Id. at 363.
43. Id.
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U.S. steam vessels to display a white masthead light and
red and green side lights."4 However, despite the American
efforts to add a domestic flavor to these rules, Congress
recognized the importance of international uniformity in
collision regulations, and in 1864, enacted a set of high seas
rules nearly identical to those of their British counter-
parts. 5 In fact, when the British revised their rules in 1884,
Congress was so concerned with this uniformity that it
adopted the same rules the following year.46
The United States also played host to the first diplo-
matic conference on navigational rules which was called by
President Benjamin Harrison in 1889.7 The conference was
held in Washington, and resulted in a set of rules known as
the International Rules for the Prevention of Collisions at
Sea,' 8 which "went into effect throughout the world in
1897. 110 Thus, at the advent of the twentieth century, the
laws of collision had completed their transformation from a
series of obscure regional dictates to a near universal set of
maritime laws.
III. KEY CONCEPTS IN COLLISION LAW
A. Fault-Based Liability
Since the days of the Roman Empire, liability for colli-
sions at sea has consistently been based upon a finding of
fault on the part of one (or both) of the parties involved. °
Thus, "the fact of collision is not in itself a sufficient ground
44. Id. at 363-64. These rules have had lasting significance, and the mid-
nineteenth century U.S. Navy system of requiring white masthead lights and
red and green running lights is still very much in effect today. See 33 U.S.C. §
2023.
45. See Healy & Sweeney I, supra note 17, at 364.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Richard H. Brown, Jr., General Principles of Liability, 51 TuL. L. REV.
820, 821 (1977).
49. Healy & Sweeney I, supra note 17, at 364. The rules adopted in
Washington in 1897 remained in effect and relatively unchanged until 1972,
when the COLREGS (1972 Collision Regulations) were adopted. See infra Part
III.B. for further discussion of the COLREGS.
50. 2 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAw 284 (3rd ed.
2001). See also supra Part II.A.
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for imposing liability."51 To determine liability, the events of
the collision must be measured against the following stan-
dards of care: (1) statutory and regulatory rules governing
the movement and management of vessels; (2) recognized
customs of navigation; and (3) general concepts of prudent
seamanship and reasonable care (i.e., negligence).' Liabil-
ity can only be imposed if a violation of at least one of these
three standards is found; for, if there is no fault, there can
be no liability. 3
The clearest and most frequent sources of liability are
violations of navigation statutes or regulations that result
in a collision.54 Findings of fault, however, are not limited to
situations where one or both parties break a codified rule.
Breaches of navigational customs can also result in a find-
ing of fault just as easily as the breach of a statute or regu-
lation.55 Unlike a statutory breach, however, the existence
of a given custom must be pleaded and proved as a fact in
such cases.56 Therefore, liability derived from a breach of
custom is not as common and not as clear-cut as liability de-
rived from violation of a statute.
Finally, liability can also be imposed even in the ab-
sence of a violation of a statute, regulation, or custom, if
there is negligence.57 As in other tort contexts, the test and
standard for a finding of negligence in a collision is reason-
able care under the circumstances-"i.e., whether the colli-
sion could 'have been prevented by the exercise of ordinary
care, caution, and maritime skill."' Obviously, this stan-
dard can only be applied on a case-by-case basis considering
51. Brown, supra note 48, at 823 (emphasis added).
52. Id. See also SCHOENBAUM, supra note 50, at 285.
53. Id. at 284. In such a "no-fault" situation, referred to as an "inevitable
accident," each of the parties involved becomes responsible for their own
damages. Schoenbaum, however, notes that today, situations where no fault can
be found are "so rare as to be virtually non-existent." Advanced techniques of
investigation and the proliferation of statutory and regulatory rules governing
shipping makes precise findings of fault and blame increasingly possible. In
fact, on ships laden with today's sophisticated navigation equipment, even fog,
storms, decreased visibility, and other traditional perils of the sea will not
preclude liability for a collision. Id.
54. Id. at 286.
55. Brown, supra note 48, at 824.
56. Id.
57. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 50, at 285.
58. Id. See also Brown, supra note 48, at 825 (quoting The Grace Girdler, 74
U.S. 196, 203 (1869)).
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the facts at bar. Generally, the highest degree of caution is
not required, and reasonable prudence is often deemed
sufficient.59 Thus, an error in judgment will not necessarily
be considered negligence; "the mistake must be one that a
prudent navigator, sailing under similar circumstances and
conditions, would not have made."'6
B. The Importance of the "Rules of the Road"
As noted in Part II.C above, the British codification of a
series of collision regulations and the acceptance of those
regulations by the global maritime community in the mid-
nineteenth century was one of the most significant occur-
rences in the history of modern collision law. The British
precedent is still reflected in the collision rules governing
the seas today. In fact, the navigation/collision prevention
regulations currently in force in international waters were
adopted at a diplomatic conference held (fittingly) in
London in 1972.1 The end-result of that conference was the
promulgation of the "COLREGS," a set of international col-
lision regulations that took effect in July 1977. To date,
most maritime nations, including the United States, have
enacted statutes applying the COLREGS not only to inter-
national waters, but to their local/internal waters as well.63
The importance of the COLREGS in the realm of col-
lision law cannot be understated. One commentator notes
that "[t]he COLREGS... are not mere prudential regula-
tions or guidelines; they are binding enactments that must
59. Id. at 825. See also SCHOENBAUM, supra note 50, at 285-86.
60. Brown, supra note 48, at 826.
61. Healy & Sweeney I, supra note 17, at 364. The 1972 Regulations have
been amended a few times since then (in 1983 and 1989), but have remained
generally the same. Id.
62. Id. "COLREGS" is short form for the original title: International
Regulations for Prevention of Collisions at Sea. It is also interesting to note that
the COLREGS were the first set of collision regulations adopted in the form of
an International convention. The convening authority for the conference that
gave birth to these regulations was a specialized agency of the United Nations,
today known was the International Maritime Organization (IMO). See id.
63. See id. at 365. The 1972 COLREGS are codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1601-
1608 (1994). Also interesting to note is that in the United States, prior to 1982,
there were three sets of statutory rules for inland waters, the "Inland Rules,"
the "Western River Rules," and the "Great Lakes Rules." Today, all inland
waters in the U.S. are governed by the "Uniform Inland Rules," which are
strikingly similar to their international COLREGS counterpart. See 33 U.S.C.
§§ 2001-2073.
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be adhered to closely."64 The existence of such a comprehen-
sive set of rules and regulations has understandably had
important legal consequences.65 As mentioned in the previ-
ous section, findings of fault based on a violation of these
regulations are the most frequent of any source of liability.
Additionally, since the rules are international in scope, they
are often interpreted by other maritime nations, such as
Great Britain and Canada. It is not uncommon for
American judges to consult the decisions of their foreign
counterparts, especially in areas where domestic authority
may be comparatively slight." Thus, an understanding of
these regulations is essential for any intelligent discussion
of collisions at sea.
C. The Pennsylvania Burden-Shifting Rule
The importance of statutory schemes like the
COLREGS as an aid in determining fault in collision cases
is universally accepted. In fact, in some legal systems, viola-
tion of a collision regulation by a given vessel can lead to a
strong presumption that the vessel was the cause of the col-
lision. The United States is one such system as a result of
the "Pennsylvania Rule," which was announced by the
Supreme Court in an 1874 decision involving a vessel of
that name. The doctrine holds as follows:
The liability for damages is upon the ship or ships whose fault
caused the injury. But when, as in this case, a ship at the time of a
collision is in actual violation of a statutory rule intended to
prevent collisions, it is no more than a reasonable presumption
that the fault, if not the sole cause, was at least a contributory
cause of the disaster. In such a case the burden rests upon the ship
64. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 50, at 287. Brown takes this idea one step
further, noting that "[for many years, the [COLREGS] have provided a
comprehensive regulatory scheme covering almost every aspect of a ship's
navigation vis-A-vis other vessels on the high seas, including specifications for
lights and day shapes for every description of vessel, regulations for sound
signals, and conduct in both clear weather and restricted visibility-in short, all
major aspects of collision avoidance." Brown, supra note 48, at 822.
65. Id. at 823. With respect to their comprehensiveness, the rules cover
everything from big picture collision avoidance to such detailed requirements as
the range and arc of visibility for a vessel's required lights. See generally 33
U.S.C. §§ 1601-1608.
66. Brown, supra note 48, at 823.
67. Nicholas J. Healy & Joseph C. Sweeney, Establishing Fault in Collision
Cases, 23 J. MAR. L. & COM. 337, 338 (1992) [hereinafter Healy & Sweeney II].
20021 991
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of showing not merely that her fault might not have been one of
the causes, or that it probably was not, but that it could not have
been.68
Thus, under the rule, once it is established that a vessel
is guilty of violating a statute or regulation, the burden of
proof (including the burden of persuasion) shifts with re-
spect to causation.69 Despite the heavy burden this rule
places on the violator, the rule is rarely determinative of ul-
timate liability, for it does not relieve either party of liabil-
ity for any other relevant faults that may have contributed
to the casualty (i.e., breaches of custom and/or negligence)."0
Though still in effect, the Pennsylvania Rule has come
under fire in recent years, and is seen by some critics as
nothing more than "an idiosyncratic presumption in
American admiralty law that has complicated the litigation
of collision cases."7 One of the reasons for such criticism is
that presumptions of the sort contained in the Pennsylvania
Rule were abolished in the international sphere in 1910."
However, despite such criticism, the rule survives to this
day, and is most often used as a threshold indicator of
liability before the courts undertake a more thorough
apportionment analysis.73
D. Apportionment
As alluded to above, in many collision cases (including
many involving the United States Navy) more than one
68. The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125, 136 (1874).
69. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 50, at 296.
70. Id.
71. George Rutherglen, Not with a Bang but a Whimper: Collisions,
Comparative Fault, and the Rule of The Pennsylvania, 67 TUL. L. REV. 733, 733
(1993). In fact, Rutherglen argues that the Pennsylvania rule is totally obsolete
and should be retracted altogether. Id. at 748. See also William Tetley, The
Pennsylvania Rule-An Anachronism? The Pennsylvania Judgment-An
Error?, 13 J. MAR. L. & COM. 127 (1982) (discussing the history of the
Pennsylvania rule and giving several reasons for its abolishment).
72. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 50, at 300. Schoenbaum describes the
Pennsylvania rule as a relic "of an earlier time when the law of collision was
beset with unrealistic rules," and suggests that it would be helpful if the United
States simply "clear[ed] the underbrush" and came into conformity with
international practice. Id. This sentiment is echoed by Nicholas J. Healy and
Joseph C. Sweeney. See Healy & Sweeney II, supra note 67.
73. Rutherglen, supra note 71, at 736, 741. See also the discussion of
apportionment in Part II.D.
992 [Vol. 50
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vessel is found to be at fault for the accident. In such
situations, a rule of comparative negligence, or
apportionment of fault, is applied to assign the appropriate
degree of liability.74 Although not adopted by the United
States until much later, the concept of apportionment of
fault on the basis of comparative negligence has been the
international law rule for almost a century, having been
adopted by the international maritime community at the
Brussels Collision Liability Convention of 1910.'5 The U.S.
Supreme Court described the doctrine of apportionment as
follows:
[W]hen two or more parties have contributed by their fault to
cause property damage in a maritime collision. . ., liability for such
damage is to be allocated among the parties proportionately to the
comparative degree of their fault, and that liability for such
damages is to be allocated equally only when the parties are
equally at fault or when it is not possible fairly to measure the
comparative degree of their fault.
76
Typically, apportionment of damages requires a de-
tailed analysis by the court, requiring it to consider the
number and quality of each party's fault(s), and set forth
liability in terms of percentages that add up to one hundred
percent (100%). 77 In general, this rule is equitable in prac-
tice and is applied effectively by courts throughout the
world.
74. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 50, at 301.
75. Id. Apportionment based on comparative negligence was not adopted by
the United States until 1975, when the Supreme Court decided the landmark
case of United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975). Up to that
point, the rule in this country was one of equal division of damages when more
than one vessel was at fault. Thus, prior to Reliable Transfer, in a two vessel
collision, for example, both vessels were required to pay fifty percent of the
damages, regardless of their individual degree of fault. If three or more vessels
were at fault, the damages were divided into equal fractions. SCHOENBAUM,
supra note 50, at 301.
76. Reliable Transfer, 421 U.S. at 411.
77. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 50, at 303. Thus, in a two vessel collision, if one
vessel was significantly more negligent than the other in causing the collision,
the liability for damages can be split according to that fault (i.e., 80-20 or 70-
30). Obviously, the results here are much more equitable than the 50-50 result
dictated by the equal division of damages rule applied in the U.S. prior to 1975.
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E. Damages
Once fault has been determined and liability
apportioned accordingly, collision law next turns to the
assignment of damages. As a threshold matter, the
allocation of damages will be dictated by whether or not the
damaged vessel(s) are found to be a total (or constructive
total) loss, or whether there is only partial damage to the
vessel(s) that justifies repair."8 In the case of a total loss, the
measure of damages will be the market value of the ship
plus interest and freight pending, less her salvage value."
When a damaged vessel is not a total (or constructive
total) loss, the traditional admiralty precept for fixing dam-
ages is restitutio in integrum. ° In fact, for more than one-
hundred years, that phrase has embodied the philosophy of
the admiralty law of collision damages, and has been cited
in over 120 reported decisions in the United States alone.8
Essentially, restitutio in integrum refers to the practice of
awarding adequate damages to ensure that the injured
vessel(s) can be restored "to the condition in which she was
at the time the collision occurred."82 Despite this ideal,
however, damages will still be allocated according to the
parties' comparative degrees of fault, as determined by the
court when it undertakes its apportionment analysis.83
Generally, costs awarded can include reimbursement
for any third party claims paid,84 reasonable salvage ex-
penses, out of pocket costs incidental to a marine casualty
(i.e., oil removal, removal of cargo, drydocking, etc.. .), and
lost profits.85 Reasonableness of costs is Often an issue with
respect to lost profits and other damages, and an owner
who claims these items is required to take reasonable
78. Id. at 309.
79. Id. With respect to a constructive total loss (i.e., a vessel whose damage
is repairable, but the cost of repairs will exceed the actual cost of the vessel) the
market value of the vessel will be used as a ceiling on any recovery. Id.
80. Michael A. Snyder, Maritime Collision Damage to Vessels and Fixed
Structures, 72 TUL. L. REv. 881, 883 (1997). The doctrine was "officially"
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in 1869, when it decided The
Baltimore. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 377 (1869).
81. Snyder, supra note 80, at 883.
82. Id. at 884 (quoting Justice Nathan Clifford in The Baltimore).
83. See Reliable Transfer, 421 U.S. at 411.
84. See Weyerhauser Steamship Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597, 604
(1963).
85. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 50, at 311-12.
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efforts to mitigate damages and minimize losses.86 The prob-
lems arising from this duty to mitigate can often be
avoided, however, if the parties can agree to commission a
joint survey to settle the extent of damages and costl of re-
pairs prior to the commencement of those repairs."
F. Prejudgment Interest
A final concept of collision law that deserves mention is
the practice of awarding prejudgment interest, which is
typically addressed after the substantive issues of a given
collision case are settled and liability is apportioned.88
Absent "peculiar" or "exceptional" circumstances that would
make an award inequitable,89 prejudgment interest is
generally awarded in collision cases as a matter of equity,
and seeks to compensate a given claimant for any actual
injury suffered." It is awarded as compensation for the lost
use of funds to which a given claimant was entitled, and not
as punishment against the opposing party for a wrongful
act. 1 The purpose of prejudgment interest, as stated by the
Ninth Circuit, is as follows:
The owner has neither the use of the vessel nor her money
equivalent during this period, and interest on her then value is
necessary for just compensation. So also with reference to monies
expended in repairs or replacements. "Interest here, as in ordinary
business transactions, is the usual and ordinary method of making
full restitution. 9 2
Thus, in accordance with the general maxim of
86. Id. at 315.
87. Id. at 310.
88. Jeb T. Terrien, Comment: Prejudgment Interest in General Maritime
Law: A Study in Confusion, 20 TUL. MAR. L.J. 441, 442 (1996).
89. See City of Milwaukee v. Cement Div., Nat'l Gypsum Co., 515 U.S. 189,
195 (1995).
90. See Terrien, supra note 88, at 443.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 445 (quoting Alkmeon Naviera, S.A. v. MIV Marina L, 633 F.2d
789 (9th Cir. 1980)). Although relatively simple in statement, prejudgment
interest is often vexing in practice, and has caused a number of disagreements
among the U.S. Circuit Courts. See Terrien, supra note 88, at 443. One area of
contention is the rate of prejudgment interest, which is generally left up to the
discretion of the court. However, this is not really an issue when the U.S. Navy
is involved, because prejudgment rates of interest for public vessels are dictated
by statute. See infra Part IV.
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restitutio in integrum, prejudgment interest is simply an-
other means of attempting to make the claimant whole.
IV. STATUTORY SCHEME: THE WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY
Whenever the prospect of suing a government arises (as
it does when a United States Naval vessel is involved in a
collision), so to does the specter of sovereign immunity.
"The concept of sovereign immunity, which shields a
government from being sued without its consent, was
derived from British legal tradition, and was brought to the
American colonies through Blackstone's Commentaries."93
The doctrine became embedded in the law of the United
States and has endured until this day; in fact, generally
speaking, the United States cannot be sued unless (1) it
consents or (2) the suit is brought pursuant to a statutory
exception.94 Such is the case with respect to admiralty
claims against the United States, which can be brought
under one of two admiralty waiver statutes: the Suits in
Admiralty Act9" or the Public Vessels Act.96 As a result of
these statutes, the United States is liable in admiralty to
roughly the same extent as any private entity.9'
A. The Suits In Admiralty Act
Prior to 1916, actions against the United States govern-
ment for damages caused by the negligent operation of
government vessels were barred by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity even though the government was free
to sue for damages caused to their own vessels by the
negligence of a private shipowner.98 In an effort to address
this inequity, Congress passed the Shipping Act of 1916,
which provided that government vessels employed as mer-
chant vessels were subject to all the laws, regulations, and
93. Sue Carter Watson, The Suits in Admiralty Act, 17 J. MAR. L. & COM.
175, 176 (1986).
94. Id.
95: 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752 (1994).
96. Id. §§ 781-790.
97. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 50, at 481.
98. Clayton G. Ramsey & Vivienne Monachino, Admiralty Claims against
the United States, 5 MAR. LAW 31, 31 (1980).
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liabilities that governed private vessels.99 However, when
the Supreme Court construed the Act as allowing
proceedings in rem against the government (which would
allow for the arrest and attachment of government vessels),
Congress balked and decided to make a change.1 °°
Thus, on March 9, 1920, Congress passed the Suits In
Admiralty Act ("the SAA"), which specifically prohibited in
rem proceedings against the United States, but allowed
actions in personam against the government where the
vessel causing the damage was employed as a "merchant
vessel" by the State."' In time, the Supreme Court held that
the remedy provided by the SAA was exclusive, and that
there were no other non-statutory remedies in admiralty
against the government."2 Congress affirmed this conclu-
sion with an amendment in 1950, making it clear that the
SAA was the exclusive admiralty remedy against the
government, its wholly owned corporations, and its agents
operating government vessels.0 3
Under the SAA, suit must be brought within two years
after the cause of action arises.' According to the weight of
authority, this two-year time period for filing suit is
"jurisdictional" and cannot be waived or tolled.' 5 Exclusive
jurisdiction for actions pursuant to the SAA lies in federal
99. Id.
100. Id. at 31-32. The Supreme Court decision that spurred Congress into
action was The Lake Monroe, 250 U.S. 246 (1919).
101. Most law students will recall (with at least some consternation) the
concepts of in rem and in personam jurisdiction from their first year Civil
Procedure classes. As a refresher: In rem jurisdiction, or jurisdiction over a
thing (i.e., a vessel), gives the court power to adjudicate a claim made about a
piece of property or about a status. In personam jurisdiction, or jurisdiction over
the defendant's "person" (i.e., over the government itself) gives the court power
to issue a judgment against the individual personally. For further refreshing,
see STEvE EMANUEL, CAPSULE SUMMARIES (Civil Procedure), available at
http://www.lawschool.lexis.comlawschool/emanuel/web/civpro2. htm (last
visited Oct. 8, 2002).
102. Ramsey & Monachino, supra note 98, at 32. The Supreme Court
decision is United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Rosenberg Bros.
& Co., 276 U.S. 202, 214 (1928).
103. Watson, supra note 93, at 177-78.
104. 46 U.S.C. § 745.
105. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 50, at 484. See also Ramsey &
Monachino, supra note 98, at 35 (explaining that failure to meet the statute of
limitations is incurable because of sovereign immunity-i.e., "the lapse of the
time period extinguishes the consent of the United States to be sued and thus
extinguishes the claim itself.")
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court, °6 and no action can be filed in state court under any
circumstances. Venue under the act is in the district where
the government vessel(s) or cargo is found or in the district
where the plaintiff resides or has a place of business.0 7 The
statute also requires that a plaintiff shall "forthwith" serve
a copy of his complaint upon the United States attorney for
the district, as well as send a copy by registered mail to the
Attorney General of the United States.0 8 Finally, with
respect to prejudgment interest, the SAA allows for such
interest back only to the time of the filing of the suit at the
rate of four percent (4%).109
B. The Public Vessels Act
One aspect of the SAA that was immediately perceived
as problematic was the fact that suits under the SAA could
only be maintained by private parties if the government
vessel involved was employed as a "merchant vessel.""'
Thus, if the government vessel involved was a "public
vessel," such as a Navy warship, there was still no remedy
available."' Congress sought to address this problem when
it passed the Public Vessels Act ("the PVA") in 1925. Like
the SAA, the PVA was intended to impose upon the United
States the same liability in the operation of its public
vessels as that imposed by the admiralty law upon private
shipowners.112 Thus, the PVA waives sovereign immunity
with respect to claims for damages caused by public vessels,
and authorizes in personam actions against the United
States for damage caused by such vessels."' In combination
106. 46 U.S.C. § 742.
107. Id.
108. Id. For a discussion of the consequences of not meeting the "forthwith"
requirement, see Watson, supra note 93, at 187-89.
109. 46 U.S.C. §§ 743, 745. With respect to the SAA's prejudgment interest
requirements, Schoenbaum comments that the restriction against pre-filing
prejudgment interest is "contrary to admiralty practice, which grants
prejudgment interest from the date of the claim," and that the four percent
interest rate is "hopelessly out of date." SCHOENBAUM, supra note 50, at 489
n.35.
110. Ramsey & Monachino, supra note 98, at 33.
111. Id.
112. Id. (citing Allen v. United States, 338 F.2d 160, 162 (9th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 961 (1965)).
113. Id. Although the PVA is similar to the SAA in that it waives the
sovereign immunity of the United States, the waiver contained in the PVA is
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with the SAA, the PVA provides the exclusive admiralty
remedy against the United States.
With respect to the specific provisions of the PVA, like
the SAA, the PVA also contains a strict two-year statute of
limitations and provides the federal courts with exclusive
jurisdiction."' The PVA choice of venue provision is likewise
similar to the SAA, but also provides that if none of the
parties suing has an office or residence in the United
States, and the vessel or cargo subject to suit is similarly
outside the United States, venue in any district court may
be proper.115 Perhaps the most significant difference
between the SAA and PVA is the PVA's requirement of
reciprocity, which mandates that an alien cannot bring suit
unless the foreign state of which he is a national allows
nationals of the United States to sue in its courts under
similar circumstances.1 '6 In practice, the reciprocity require-
ment has been strictly applied."7 Additionally, unlike the
SAA, the PVA does not provide for prejudgment interest,
except in contract cases for which it is expressly stipu-
lated."8 Finally, the PVA contains the unique limitation
that no officer or member of the crew of any public vessel
may be subpoenaed in connection with any suit brought
under the act, without the consent of the responsible
Secretary or the commanding officer of the vessel."9
C. The Relationship Between the SAA and PVA
Initially, the SAA and PVA appeared to complement
each other well, with the SAA applying only to government
operated merchant vessels and the PVA governing public
"much more restrictive than the consent to suit of the [SAA]." See Peter Child
Nosek, Unifying Claims against the United States: A Proposal to Repeal the
Suits in Admiralty Act and the Public Vessels Act, 30 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 41, 45
(1999).
114. 46 U.S.C. § 782. Regarding the statute of limitations, failure of a
claimant to meet the 2 year requirement is also considered an incurable fault
under the PVA. See supra note 105.
115. 46 U.S.C. § 782.
116. Id. § 785.
117. See, e.g., United States v. Cont'l Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164 (1976)
(holding that an alien corporation was barred even though its shares were
ninety-nine percent owned by American citizens). See also infra Part V.B. for a
more thorough discussion of the Continental Tuna case.
118. 46 U.S.C. § 782.
119. Id. § 784.
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vessels. However, as time wore on, confusion arose over the
distinction, and "'it became very difficult for litigants and
even courts to distinguish between public vessels and mer-
chant vessels,' a problem that was compounded when cargo
vessels were used by the government during World War
.11.020 Thus, in 1960, Congress passed an amendment to the
SAA that deleted the "employed as a merchant vessel"
requirement, hoping to solve the many problems that had
arisen as a result of the "merchant vessel"/"public vessel"
dichotomy. 2' Unfortunately, confusion regarding this dis-
tinction persisted.
Some read Congress' action as extending the reach of
the SAA to the "full range of admiralty cases" against the
government, making the need for the PVA virtually nil. 12 In
fact, the Ninth Circuit went so far as to declare that the
PVA was redundant in light of the 1960 amendments to the
SAA. 123 The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Ninth
Circuit and ruled that claims within the scope of the PVA
remained as such, even after the 1960 Amendments to the
SAA. 24 Critics today are still divided as to whether or not
this overlapping statutory scheme is viable. For example,
some scholars, such as Peter Child Nosek, argue that both
the SAA and PVA should be repealed.'25 In contrast, other
critics, such as Sue Carter Watson, contend that despite the
1960 amendment to the SAA, the SAA and PVA remain
part of a mutually exclusive complementary scheme, and
should be left to operate as such.
12
Regardless of those opinions, however, the SAA and
PVA both remain in effect today and will presumably re-
main so in the future.
120. Nosek, supra note 113, at 46 (quoting Comment, The Suits in
Admiralty Act: Sovreign Benevolence in Need of Reform, 7 MAR. LAW 283
(1982)).
121. Id. at 48-49.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 50.
124. United States v. Cont'l Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164 (1976)
125. See, e.g., Nosek, supra note 113 (arguing that both the SAA and PVA
should be repealed, leaving maritime tort claims to be brought in the U.S. Court
of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act and a re-vamped Federal Tort Claims
Act).
126. See, e.g., Watson, supra note 93.
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V. THE UNITED STATES NAVY IN COURT
When Congress enacted the PVA in 1925, one of the
motivating factors was that in the three years previous,
there had been more than 450 collisions involving govern-
ment vessels in public service. 127 Thus, from the beginning,
it was relatively obvious that public vessels were no strang-
ers to collision. The same can be said of the United States
Navy, which has found itself in court fairly frequently, even
in just the past fifty years. From aircraft carriers and
destroyers to ammunition ships and submarines, the ships
of the United States Navy have been involved in their fair
share of collisions at sea.
A. USS Saratoga
In April 1968,128 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit decided a case involving a collision between
a United States Navy aircraft carrier, the USS Saratoga
(CVA 60), and a German-flagged freighter and ore carrier,
the M.S. Bernd Leonhardt.'2" Despite near perfect weather
conditions, a long observation of one another, and the
exchange of a "cheery greeting," the two vessels collided in
open waters off the coast of North Carolina.' The district
court found the Bernd Leonhardt solely at fault for the colli-
sion, and absolved the Saratoga completely; the Bernd
Leonhardt appealed.'
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit refused to accept the dis-
trict court's ruling absolving the aircraft carrier of fault in
the collision. The appellate court instead looked at the
127. Nosek, supra note 113, at 45 (citing a Senate Claims Committee report
supporting the PVA).
128. Note that this case occurred in 1968, about seven years prior to the
Supreme Court's landmark admiralty decision adopting the rule of
apportionment in Reliable Transfer. See supra Part III.D. Thus, at the time of
this decision, if both vessels displayed fault, the division of liability was
automatically fifty-fifty. Note as well that this case was also pre-COLREGS
(adopted in 1972). Still, the application of the then existing rules of the road by
the Fourth Circuit is enlightening.
129. Partenreederei M. S. Bernd Leonhardt v. United States, 393 F.2d 756
(4th Cir. 1968).
130. Id. at 757. The "cheery greeting" reported by the court was a "bon
voyage" sent from the Saratoga to the Bernd Leonhardt via flashing light
signals. Id. at 758.
131. Id.
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Saratoga's actions in the ten minutes prior to the collision,
which included a series of violations of the Rules of the
Road, as grounds for reversal.3 2 Despite the fact that her
role as the stand-on ("privileged") vessel dictated otherwise,
and in direct violation of the International Rules of the
Road, the Saratoga had engaged in various course changes
immediately prior to the collision."' Thus, in light of the
Saratoga's failure to follow the rules, the Fourth Circuit
held that there was insufficient ground to exonerate the
carrier completely, and therefore it should have been held
equally at fault with the Bernd Leonhardt.'34
B. USS Parsons
One of the most significant collisions involving a United
States Navy vessel occurred in late 1969, when the USS
Parsons (DDG 33) collided with the Philippine fishing
vessel M/ V Orient. The Parsons collision was significant for
two reasons: first, because it resulted in the total loss of the
Orient, which sank as a result of the impact; and second,
because the resulting litigation forced the Supreme Court to
interpret the effect of the 1960 Amendments to the SAA on
that Act's relationship with the PVA.3 5
The suit in this case was initially brought pursuant to
the SAA and PVA in the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California by Continental Tuna, Inc., the
Philippine corporation that owned the MIV Orient. The
District Court granted the United States' motion for
summary judgment on reciprocity grounds, and dismissed
the complaint. 36 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed that
decision, holding that even though the Parsons was a public
vessel, because of the 1960 Amendments to the SAA, the
appellant's action was maintainable under that Act, which
132. Id.
133. In accordance with Rules 19 and 21 of the International Rules of the
Road in effect at the time, the Saratoga was required to maintain her course
and speed and keep out of the way of the Leonhardt unless emergency or
necessity dictated otherwise. See id. at 761 (Bryan, J., concurring) (citing 33
U.S.C. §§ 146(c) and 146(e)). Obviously, by changing course repeatedly with no
apparent necessity and in the light of no emergency, the Saratoga failed in this
regard.
134. Id. at 759.
135. See supra Part IV.C.
136. United States v. Cont'l Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 165-66 (1976).
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has no reciprocity provision.137 The United States under-
standably took exception to that ruling and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.
138
The Supreme Court's decision focused on the relation-
ship between the SAA and PVA, and looked primarily at
"'whether Congress intended, by the deletion of the 'em-
ployed as a merchant vessel' proviso from the [SAA], to
authorize the wholesale evasion of the restrictions specifi-
cally imposed by the [PVA] on suits for damages caused by
public vessels."" After a thorough exploration of the history
behind both the SAA and PVA, the Court concluded that
even after the 1960 amendments to the SAA, claims within
the scope of the PVA were to remain subject to its terms. 40
Thus, because there was no dispute that Continental
Tuna's claim fell within the embrace of the PVA, the Court
held the Ninth Circuit ruling to be in error and reversed,
remanding the case for further proceedings. 4'
C. USS Chandler
On June 6, 1985, the USS Chandler (DDG 994), a
United States Navy guided missile destroyer was steaming
up the Columbia River en route to Portland, Oregon for the
city's annual Rose Festival."2 Simultaneously, the tug Mary
B was pushing a pair of barges loaded with wood chips
downstream.4 3 As the two vessels passed one another, a
swell caused by the Chandler's passage swept under the
Mary B and her barges, causing damage to one of the
barges and the loss of most of its cargo. 44 The owners of the
Mary B subsequently brought suit under the PVA for the
damage caused by the Chandler's unruly swell.
Although the damage in this case was not caused by a
collision per se, the District of Oregon recognized that the
137. Cont'l Tuna Corp. v. United States, 499 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1974). The
Ninth Circuit's logic was essentially that the 1960 Amendment to the SAA
erasing the distinction between "merchant" vessels and "public" vessels had
made the actionmaintainable under either act.
138. 420 U.S. 971 (1975).
139. Cont'l Tuna, 425 U.S. at 169.
140. Id. at 181.
141. Id. at 181-82.
142. Bernert Towboat Co. v. USS Chandler (DDG 996), 666 F. Supp. 1454,
1456 (D. Or. 1987).
143. Id.
144. Id.
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term "collision" can be broadly construed so as to include
damage caused by a tug striking another ship's wake. 145 In
fact, in light of the Chandler's statutory duty to maintain a
safe speed and exercise reasonable care as it traveled up-
river and the fact that she had been traveling at over
twenty knots,146 the Mary B's cause of action against the
Chandler was basically a foregone conclusion. 147 The
Chandler's excessive speed was a clear-cut statutory viola-
tion; thus, the burden of proof (and persuasion) shifted to
her under the Pennsylvania Rule,148 forcing her to prove
that her fault (i.e., not maintaining a safe speed) could not
have been a cause of the accident.19 In light of all the
evidence, the court concluded that the Chandler had indeed
violated the safe speed rule and breached her duty to exer-
cise reasonable care to avoid creating a dangerous swell. 5 °
Thus, the court held the Chandler one hundred percent
(100%) at fault for the collision, and assigned damages
accordingly.
D. USS Mount Baker
As the three previous cases discussed in this Part
demonstrate, more often than not, collisions at sea involve
only a pair of vessels. There are times, however, when
multi-vessel collisions occur, and the Navy is not immune
from these types of collisions either. One such multi-vessel
collision involved the USS Mount Baker (AE 34), a United
States Navy ammunition ship. In the early morning hours
of March 24, 1989, the Mount Baker was involved in a
three-vessel collision with the tug Starcrescent and the tow
TMI-96, which, in tandem with the Starcrescent, was
transporting fertilizer from the Gulf of Mexico to Virginia."'
At the time of the collision, the Mount Baker was engaged
145. Id. at 1457 (citing Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 604 F.
Supp. 1517, 1523 (W.D. Pa. 1985)).
146. Id. at 1458.
147. See id. at 1457 (discussing the traditional duty of larger vessels to not
create dangerous swells). See also 33 U.S.C. § 2006, which contains the Safe
Speed Rule applicable in this situation.
148. See supra Part III.C.
149. Bernert Towboat, 666 F. Supp. at 1457.
150. Id. at 1459.
151. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 966 F.2d 820, 822
(4th Cir. 1992).
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in a search and rescue mission in the vicinity of the
Chesapeake Bay with a group of Coast Guard and Navy
ships. I2
After the collision, Allied Towing, the owner of the
Starcrescent, filed a claim against the United States
pursuant to the PVA; the United States filed a counter-
claim against both Allied and the Starcrescent itself. During
a five-day bench trial, the district court made findings that
both the Mount Baker and Starcrescent had been operating
in violation of the rules of the road, and were therefore at
fault in the collision; the court found that TMI-96, an
unmanned barge, was not at fault.153 Having decided that
both the Mount Baker and Starcrescent were at fault, the
court next considered the issue of damages, which it
apportioned equally between the two."' There were
numerous appeals from the court's ruling, including one
from Allied Towing based on apportionment. On appeal,
the Fourth Circuit held that the district court's ruling on
apportionment was not clearly erroneous; for, the testimony
below made it clear that both the Mount Baker and the
Starcrescent were violating the rules of the road at the time
of the accident."6 Additionally, Allied Towing argued that
TMI-96 had also violated the rules of the road by failing to
display proper navigation lights, but the Fourth Circuit
disregarded that argument, upholding the district court's
conclusion that it would not have made "one iota of differ-
ence one way or the other" whether the barge's navigation
lights were on."' The Fourth Circuit thus affirmed the dis-
152. Id.
153. Id. at 823. Specifically, the district court found that the Mount Baker
was not making proper use of its radar, was not sounding fog signals, and was
traveling at an excessive rate of speed. As for the Starcrescent, the court found
that its use of a 2000-foot towline was unnecessarily risky, and that it also
failed to make proper use of its radar, was not sounding fog signals, and was
traveling at an excessive rate of speed. Id.
154. The total amount of damages the two vessels were required to split was
approximately $816,000.00. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 824.
157. Id. at 825. The court's ruling regarding TMI-96 highlights one of the
exceptions to the general rule that violation of a navigational statute imposes
liability; namely, that non-contributory violations of the statutes can be
excused. See Brown, supra note 48, at 830-31.
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trict court's apportionment ruling, and remanded the case
for reconsideration of the damages award.'58
E. USS Virginia
As noted earlier, the importance of following the rules
of the road cannot be overemphasized, and this is a fact
that the United States Navy definitely recognizes.159 How-
ever, the Navy's commitment to ensuring that its own
personnel are well versed in the rules does not always
prevent collisions; for, sometimes the failure of other
vessels to follow the rules can lead to collisions as well.
Such was the case in February 1991, when the U.S. Navy
nuclear cruiser, the USS Virginia (CGN-38)1 collided with
and sank the Greek fishing vessel Vassilios I. 6
The Virginia was returning from the Persian Gulf,
where it had participated in Operation Desert Storm, and
was transiting the Straits of Andikithiron off the coast of
Crete, en route to a port visit in Souda Bay, Crete.16' The
Vassilios I was underway in those same waters fishing for
swordfish.'62 On the evening of February 22, 1991, as the
crew of the Vassilios I was collecting her fishing line, they
discovered that the line had somehow been cut, and
commenced a search for the missing line.1 6' The search
continued into the early hours of February 23, and thor-
oughly absorbed the attention of the entire crew, so much so
that they lost touch with their surroundings, and neglected
to consult their radar.6 4 The Virginia, meanwhile, contin-
ued to track the smaller fishing vessel, and established that
the two would pass safely within approximately two-
thousand yards of one another.161 Unfortunately, those esti-
158. Allied Towing, 966 F.2d at 830.
159. For example, from personal experience, I know that at the Navy's
Surface Warfare Officer's School in Newport, Rhode Island, the very first
subject that is addressed is the Rules of the Road. In fact, the entire first week
of the approximately sixteen week training program is dedicated solely to
learning and understanding those fundamental rules. Also, I can personally
attest that once out of school and out at sea, training to ensure Rules of the
Road proficiency is regular as well.
160. See Paterakis v. United States, 849 F. Supp. 1106 (E.D. Va. 1994).
161. Id. at 1107.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1109.
165. Id. at 1108-09.
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mates turned out to be optimistic, and the vessels subse-
quently collided.
Although the Virginia was directly involved in the colli-
sion, the Eastern District of Virginia held that she was in
no way responsible for the damage that occurred. The court
held that Virginia had complied with the rules of the road
and had operated prudently and properly under the circum-
stances. 6 As for the Vassilios I, the court held that the fish-
ing vessel's numerous violations of the rules of the road
were the direct cause of the collision.167 Therefore, the plain-
tiffs (the Captain of the Vassilios I and some of the
crewmembers) were held to have failed to meet their bur-
den of proof, and the United States was spared of liability
for any injuries or damages suffered.'68
F. USS Jacksonville
As the Greeneville-Ehime Maru incident vividly attests,
collisions at sea involving Naval vessels are not limited to
surface ships-submarines get into accidents as well. An
example of this truism that predates the Greeneville
incident is the collision that occurred between the USS
Jacksonville (SSN 699) and the M/V Saudi Makkah in May
1996.169 Unlike some of the other collisions discussed in this
section, the visibility at the time the Jacksonville and
Saudi Makkah collided was poor due to fog. 7° As a result,
166. Id. at 1112.
167. Id. at 1112-13. Specifically, the court held that the Vassilios I had
violated the rules of the road by: (1) failing to maintain a proper lookout; (2)
failing to assess the risk of collision using all available means, including radar if
installed; and (3) failure to properly discharge their statutory duty as "give-
way" vessel (i.e., maneuvering to avoid the "stand-on" vessel (i.e., the Virginia)).
Id.
168. Id. at 1111-13.
169. See Nat'l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 2d
482 (E.D. Va. 2000). Note that the plaintiff in this case is the same shipping
company that owns the M/V Saudi Riyadh, the ship involved in the Radford
collision. See supra Part I and infra Part VI for further discussion of the
Radford collision.
170. Nat'l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 485. At trial,
both parties stipulated that as a result of the fog, they were operating in
restricted visibility within the meaning of the Rules of the Road. An obvious
question here is why fog should be a concern at all for a submarine? The answer
is that submarines do not always travel underwater. Most often, while
transiting through shipping channels, as was the situation in the case at bar,
submarines will stay on the surface. In these situations, the COLREGS treats
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both vessels were required by law to sound appropriate
sound signals and maintain a safe speed appropriate for the
conditions. Although each vessel sounded the appropriate
sound signals, neither heeded the safe speed requirement,
and the court found that the speed of each vessel was
"excessive and unsafe given the restricted visibility." '171
Therefore, from the outset, it was clear that both vessels
had violated a statutory provision and could be held liable
for that fault.
In order to determine the exact degrees of fault, the
court undertook the standard apportionment analysis com-
mon to collision cases post-Reliable Transfer.172 Specifically,
the court acknowledged that both vessels were at fault
because of their unsafe speed, but held that the
Jacksonville was to bear the greater burden because she
was the first vessel to turn to port, an action frowned upon
in maritime law since the mid-nineteenth century.7 3 Thus,
the court allocated responsibility for the damages at eighty
percent (80%) for the Jacksonville, and twenty percent
(20%) for the Makkah.7 4
A final aspect of this case worth mentioning concerns
pre-judgment interest. As noted in Part IV.B. above, the
PVA does not allow for prejudgment interest unless ex-
pressly stipulated in a contract. Thus, in a case such as
this, where the National Shipping Company of Saudi
Arabia brought their action pursuant to the PVA, no
prejudgment interest could be awarded on their claim. With
respect to the United States, however, the question of a
prejudgment interest award is significantly different. The
United States brought their claim under general admiralty
law, which calls for the awarding of pre-judgment interest
as a matter of routine.'76  Therefore, although the
Jacksonville bore the majority of fault for the collision, the
submarines the same as any other power-driven surface vessel.
171. Id. at 489.
172. For a more thorough discussion of the Reliable Transfer decision and
the concept of apportionment in general, see supra Part III.D.
173. Nat'l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 490-92. See also
supra note 38 and accompanying text.
174. Nat'l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 494.
175. 46 U.S.C. § 782.
176. See City of Milwaukee v. Cement Div., Nat'l Gypsum Co., 515 U.S. 189
(1995) (holding that pre-judgment interest is to be awarded routinely in
admiralty cases).
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United States was deemed able to collect pre-judgment
interest running from the date of the casualty.
VI. CASE STUDY: USS ARTHUR W. RADFORD
In the Introduction to this paper, I set forth the
background of the 1999 collision between the USS Arthur
W. Radford and the MIV Saudi Riyadh. As I mentioned in
that section, the Radford incident was one that effected me
profoundly at the time, primarily because that ship and her
crew were virtually indistinguishable from my own crew on
Hayler. Thus, I followed the events that occurred in the
aftermath of the collision, including the ensuing trial, with
great interest. Although I was not aware of it at the time
the events occurred (and never conceived of actually writing
an essay covering those events), the proceedings that flowed
from the Radford/Riyadh collision are instructive on a
number of the key collision law concepts discussed in this
paper. Therefore, I will detail those proceedings below.
A. Pre-trial Filings
The Navy did not waste any time in initiating the legal
proceedings in this matter, and filed a complaint with the
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia exactly
one week after the collision, blaming the Riyadh for the
accident and estimating damages at approximately $65
million dollars.'78 Shortly thereafter, the owners of the
Riyadh responded, denying the government's allegations
and filing a cross-claim on their own behalf.179 In light of the
Navy's large damage assessment, the owners of the Riyadh
also took the preemptive strategic step of attempting to
limit their liability in the matter by contending that the
177. Nat'l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 495-97. The court
acknowledged this anomalous result, but felt itself bound nonetheless to "apply
the statutory scheme set forth by Congress." Id. at 496.
178. See Jack Dorsey, Saudi Filing Blames Navy for Feb. 4 Collision at Sea,
THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb. 19, 1999, at Al. The Navy did not actually file the
papers on its own behalf, however. The suit was filed by the Department of
Justice.
179. See id. In their cross-claim, the owners of the Riyadh listed a number
of alleged violations of the Rules of the Road by the Radford, including altering
course to port, failure to maintain a lookout, and failure to sound proper whistle
signals.
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value of the Riyadh and her cargo was only worth $7.3
million."'0 Damages to the Riyadh were estimated at
approximately $1.1 million.8
The case went to trial (without jury) before Judge
Rebecca Beach Smith on January 24, 2000.
B. Fault and Apportionment
Following two weeks of trial and the presentation of
much testimony and evidence, the court's initial tasks were
to determine fault and apportion liability.'82 After closely
examining the facts presented, the court determined that
both the Radford and the Riyadh were negligent in this
case. 83 Both vessels were found guilty of violating the Rules
of the Road as well, and the court held that those violations
directly contributed to the accident." Specifically, the court
held that the Radford had violated Rule 17 of the
COLREGS (governing the actions of the stand-on vessel in
a crossing situation) and Rule 5 (requiring vessels to post a
proper lookout).'85 As for the Riyadh, the court found her in
violation of Rule 16 (governing the actions of the give-way
vessel), Rule 8 (governing actions to be taken to avoid a
collision), Rule 7 (mandating use of every available means
180. Id. Maritime Law generally limits the value of a claim such as the
Navy's to the value of the ship, its cargo and tackle at the time of the accident.
181. See Jack Dorsey, 8 Radford Sailors Sue Saudi Firm for Damages, THE
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, June 11, 1999, at B1. Also, as the headline for this article
indicates, a group of Radford sailors injured on the night of the collision
brought separate suits on their own behalf. The suits of the personal injury
claimants were all ultimately settled. In re Nat'l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia,
147 F. Supp. 2d 425, 430 n.1 (E.D. Va. 2000).
182. Id. at 430. The Judge's assessment of the situation was as follows:
After over two weeks of trial, it remains inconceivable to the court
that two large ships, both properly equipped with radar and properly
lighted, collided in the open ocean on a clear night, with no other ship
traffic in the vicinity restricting their maneuverability or visibility.
Nonetheless, such a collision did occur, and the court must now assess
the evidence before it, allocate the fault, and determine issues of
liability and limitation.
Id.
183. See id. at 430-40. The Court does a very thorough job of spelling out all
the facts in this case.
184. Id. at 438-39.
185. Id. at 439.
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to avoid collision), and Rule 34 (requiring sound signals in
certain circumstances)." 6
Given that both vessels were clearly at fault, the court's
next task was to allocate that fault under the principles of
comparative negligence, and apportion liability accordingly.
The court found that the majority of the fault lay with the
Riyadh, and held that she was sixty-five percent (65%) at
fault for the collision; the Radford was assigned the balance
of the blame, and was held to be thirty-five percent (35%) at
fault for the mishap.'87
C. Assessment of Damages
Once liability was established and fault allocated, the
court was able to focus on allocation of damages. As noted
above, the owners of the Riyadh attempted to limit their
liability to the cost of the ship and its cargo (approx. $7.3
million dollars). Before addressing liability directly, the
court spent a good deal of time examining the owners' re-
quest, and ultimately granted it.' 8 The court then closed
the initial proceedings, ordering both parties to submit find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law on the issue of damages
within a nine-day period.189
Upon receipt of the requested information, the court re-
sumed its deliberations. In determining damages, the court
recognized that, as a threshold matter, "'restitutio in
integrum is the precept in fixing damages' in admiralty,"
but that damages "must be allocated according to the
parties' comparative degrees of fault."'9 ° Thus, the court's
earlier decision that fault would be allocated 65/35 was a
controlling factor. Another important factor in determining
186. Id. at 438-39.
187. Id. at 440.
188. See id. at 440-46. The court's decision to allow a limit on the owner's
liability was a major victory for the Riyadh, because without the limit, they
could have been held liable for up to sixty-five percent (65%) of the Radford's
thirty-two million dollar repair bill (roughly $20.8 million dollars!). See Jack
Dorsey, Saudi Ship, Radford Share Blame, Judge Limits Damages Due to Navy
from Collision at Sea Off Virginia Beach, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT, June 23, 2000,
at B1.
189. Nat'l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 446. The
opinion was handed down on June 21, 2000, and the parties were required to
submit their materials on or before June 30, 2000.
190. In re Nat'l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia, No. 2:99CV223, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19956, at *6 (E.D. Va. July 31, 2000).
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damages was the claimant's duty to mitigate-a duty that
the owners of the Riyadh claimed the Navy had failed to
meet."' The court, however, found otherwise, and held that
the repairs to the Radford had been conducted appropri-
ately." Therefore, the court awarded the United States the
maximum liability available-$7.3 million-less the
$120,000.00 the owners of the Riyadh had paid earlier to
settle the personal injury cases."' No damages were
awarded to the owners of the Riyadh, however, because
such damages were considered in the court's earlier
decision to limit the owners' liability, and a "second" award
at this point was considered inequitable.'
D. Prejudgment Interest
The final aspect of this case discussed by the court was
the issue of prejudgment interest. The court recognized that
prejudgment interest is generally awarded in admiralty
cases, absent peculiar or exceptional circumstances because
it is essential to ensuring "full and fair compensation" to
the injured party.'95 The court also noted that it retained
broad discretion in establishing the rate for pre-judgment
interest.96 Thus, the Court awarded pre-judgment interest
to the United States, at a rate of 4.584%, compounded
annually from the date of the collision. 9'
VII. CONCLUSION: PREDICTIONS FOR THE EHIME MARu
In the months since the USS Greeneville sent the
Ehime Maru to the bottom of the Pacific Ocean, much has
occurred, including threats of legal action from some of the
191. See id. at *7-*8. Specifically, the owners of the Riyadh argued that the
Navy had failed to mitigate by choosing the more expensive repair option (i.e.,
opting to have the entire bow of the ship replaced rather than rebuilt) and
choosing to conduct the repairs at a more expensive shipyard.
192. See id.
193. Id. at *9.
194. See id. at *9 n4.
195. Id. at *10. The Court also recognized in a footnote that under the PVA
no prejudgment interest would have been allowed the owners of the Riyadh had
they not already limited their liability.
196. Id. at *11-*12.
197. Id. at *12-*13. 4.584% is the statutory suggested rate set forth by
Congress in 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (2000).
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Japanese citizens affected by this tragedy.198 Perhaps the
most important event, although not necessarily of direct
legal significance, was the momentous six-week, $60 million
dollar effort by the Navy to raise the Ehime Maru and
attempt to recover the remains of those declared missing."'
The highly successful effort, which resulted in the recovery
of all but one of the nine missing victims, was extremely
important from a public relations standpoint and eased the
pain of the Japanese families that had lost their fathers,
sons, and brothers."' However, despite the valiant U.S.
recovery effort, compensation is still being discussed, and
the victims of the Ehime Maru incident may yet have their
day in court.
The first question that comes to mind when discussing
the possibility of a suit by Japanese citizens against the
United States is: Can there be a suit? For example, under
the PVA, the statute that would govern any action against
the United States, there is a strict requirement of
reciprocity.2"' Thus, in order for a Japanese citizen to be
eligible to bring suit, the claimant would have to establish
that a similarly situated United States citizen would be
able to bring an analogous suit in Japan. Thomas
Schoenbaum addressed this question shortly after the
incident, and discovered that a United States citizen would
indeed be able to sue under Japanese law; 202 the reciprocity
requirement is therefore satisfied.
The question of venue is currently something of a
wildcard in this matter, because the potential claimants are
198. See As Ehime Maru Search Ends, Focus Shifts to Compensation, DAILY
YoMIU, Nov. 27, 2001, at 3 [hereinafter Compensation]; Christopher Cottrell,
Japanese Kin Seek Solace for Sea Losses, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 4, 2001, at A9;
Lawyers of 2 Victims of Ehime Maru Plan to Sue U.S. Government, JAPAN ECON.
NEWSWIRE, Nov. 22, 2001.
199. See Body Recovery Done, Japanese Ship Hit by U.S. Sub is Scuttled,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 26, 2001, at N15; Howard W. French, U.S. Makes
Amends to Japan for Sinking of Ship, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2001, at A6; James
Sterngold, Navy's Recovery Effort Begins for Trawler Sunk in Accident, N. Y.
TIMES, Oct. 13, 2001, at A8.
200. See Yasuo Shinomiya, U.S. Deserves Praise for Ehime Maru Recovery,
DAILY YOMIURI, Nov. 15, 2001, at 17.
201. See supra Part IV.B.
202. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The Ehime Maru Incident and the Law,
ASIL Insights (March 2001), available at http://www.asil.org/ insights/
insigh64.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2002). Schoenbaum specifically cites Article 6
of the Kokka Baisyou Ho as support for that conclusion.
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all Japanese nationals with no American interests. In such
a case, the PVA dictates that if none of the parties resides
or has an office in the United States and the collision
occurred outside U.S. territorial waters, then the suit can
be brought in any United States District Court."3 Whether
the collision occurred inside or outside U.S. territorial
waters is currently in dispute for other reasons.2 4 Thus, the
exact venue cannot be determined at this point. However,
assuming the accident occurred inside U.S. territorial
waters, the venue would have to be the District of Hawaii
(i.e., the district in which the collision occurred). Otherwise,
the venue will be up to the claimants, and their preference,
if any, is currently unknown.
Another important question is to determine how long
the victims are eligible to sue. Given that the statute of
limitations under the PVA is two years,0 5 any action
against the United States must be filed by February 9,
2003. Thus, any party contemplating suit still has roughly
six months in which to file.
A factor that lies in favor of any party contemplating
suit is the fact that the United States has already accepted
full responsibility for the collision.2 6 Therefore, no compara-
tive negligence or apportionment of fault analysis would
apply in this case. The United States acceptance of
responsibility is tantamount to a stipulation that they are
one hundred percent (100%) liable for this accident. Given
this acceptance of liability on behalf of the United States,
the question then becomes one of determining exactly what
types of damages are available.
With respect to the owners of the Ehime Maru, they
would be entitled to the full replacement cost of their lost
vessel under the principle of restitutio in integrum. The
responsibility of the court would be to accept proposed costs
by both sides and determine a fair amount of compensation.
At a public auction on November 28, 2001, the prefectural
government that owned the Ehime Maru set the replace-
ment cost for the vessel at approximately 1.06 billion yen
(approximately 7.5 million US Dollars), a figure that the
203. 46 U.S.C. § 782.
204. See Compensation, supra note 198.
205. See supra Part IV.B.
206. See Compensation, supra note 198.
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United States contests. 2" The Navy contends that deprecia-
tion on the vessel must be considered, because the ship was
originally built four years ago.2 8 Thus, unless the two sides
come to an agreement, the court may have to make a deci-
sion regarding fair compensation.
With respect to the victims of the collision, the United
States government has already agreed to cover the costs of
any mental health -treatment required by survivors diag-
nosed as having post-traumatic stress disorder.29 The
gesture of goodwill by the United States has been
graciously accepted, but does not preclude anyone from
bringing suit. The U.S. Government has also been working
diligently with representatives of the families of seven of
the victims to work out a settlement in this case. 10 How-
ever, at their latest meeting, the families rejected the U.S.
offer as being too low. 21' One reason for the impasse is that
the United States contends that the vessel was sunk in
international waters, where the law does not have any
provision for compensating emotional pain and suffering.
Thus, the United States argues that any emotional pain
should be covered by Japan's Civil Code, which would
significantly decrease the amount of the settlement.2 3 The
families, however, contend that the incident occurred in
U.S. territorial waters, which would allow the case to be
governed by the more liberal U.S. laws allowing compensa-
tion for emotional pain.24 Given that the families base their
argument on a 1998 U.S. Presidential ordinance extending
207. U.S. Navy, Ehime Government Remain Apart on Redress for Sunken
Ship, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, Dec. 15, 200.1.
208. Id.
209. See Compensation, supra note 198. Currently, about half of the twenty-
six survivors have been diagnosed as suffering from PTSD. See 2 Ehime Maru
Crew Members Suffering PTSD to be Compensated, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE,
June 18, 2002.
210. See U.S. Navy Presents Compensation Amount for Ehime Maru
Victims, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, Dec. 14, 2001. The families of two of the nine
victims have hired a team of lawyers outside the main group to discuss
compensation with the U.S. on their own and explore the possibility of suit. See
Compensation, supra note 198. As of August 2002, the U.S. Navy was preparing
to enter informational talks with those families. See U.S. Navy to Set Meeting
for Kin of Two Ehime Maru Victims, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, Aug. 12, 2002.
211. See 7 Ehime Maru Families Reject U.S. Offer, DAILY YOMIURI, Dec. 16,
2001, at 2.
212. See Compensation, supra note 198.
213. See id.
214. See id.
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the reach of U.S Territorial waters,215 it is difficult to specu-
late how a court would rule on this matter.
At this point, however, no suits have officially been
brought, and all parties are still displaying a willingness to
negotiate. Thus, we can only wait and see if the legal
framework described in this paper will be played out in
full. 2
16
215. See id.
216. In April 2002, the U.S. Navy and Japan's Ehime prefectural
government signed an accord for about $11.47 million in compensation for
damages suffered by the local government over the incident, including loss of
the ship and provision of financial aid and counseling to survivors.
Compensation talks with the families of the deceased (minus the two families
who have decided to pursue a separate course of action) continue. See U.S to
Expedite Resolving Ehime Maru Compensation Issue, JAPAN WEEKLY MONITOR,
May 20, 2002.
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